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PARTIES 
The parties in this case are as follows: Appellant is Joe David Bosquez, 
represented by Brett M. Kraus, Attorney at Law. Appellee is the State of Utah, 
which is represented by Ryan Tenney, Assistant Attorney General. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this case as this appeal pertains to an appeal 
of a final order of a criminal case, held in district court, a court of record, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
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COUNSEL WHEN FAILING TO OBJECT TO HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH 
PROVIDED THE ONLY BASIS FOR THE STATE'S CONCLUSION THAT 
THE APPELLANT DROVE THE VEHICLE. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law,' which we review for correctness." State v. Cox, 2007 
UT App 317, H 10, 169 P.3d 806 (quoting State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ^ 6, 89 P.3d 
162). To support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 
demonstrate, first, "that counsel's performance was deficient" and, second, "that 
counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
U 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In evaluating counsel's performance, " an 
ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or 
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions," State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 
468 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), and "[w]here the record appears inadequate in any 
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in 
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively," Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 
17, 12 P.3d 92. To show prejudice, a defendant must establish that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a 
reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
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outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
2. THE APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE 
VEHICLE WHEN HE WAS INTOXICATED AND SLEEPING IN A VEHICLE, 
IN WHICH HE LIVED, WHETHER THE KEYS WERE IN THE IGNITION OR 
NOT. 
For issues of fact, the court affords the jury's decision great deference, and 
"viewfs] the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Jensen v. Young, 2010 Utah 67 (quoting Bodell Constr. Co. v. 
Robbins, 2009 UT 52, |16, 215 P.3d 933.) However, this issue deals with 
significant legal issues, for which the review is for correctness. Ostler v. Buhler, 
1999 UT 99,15, 989 P.2d 1073 (1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides the right of the 
accused to have the assistance of Counsel, which by its guarantee implies that the 
assistance would be effective. Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Another provision is the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and its guarantee 
to be secure in one's house. Additionally counsel relies on Articles 5 and 6 of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Joe David Bosquez was convicted of Driving Under the Influence in 
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violation of Utah Code Annotated §41-61-502 before a jury of his peers on the 
27th day of November, 2007. During the trial where this happened, Mr. Bosquez 
was represented by counsel, a Ms. Stephanie K. Miya, who represented Mr. 
Bosquez in this matter. Mr. Bosquez was sentenced in the case on January 31, 
2008. In a timely manner following his conviction and sentencing, the Defendant, 
Mr. Bosquez, submitted his notice of appeal to the state requesting review of these 
facts and this court accepted the case. Defendant/Appellant through counsel now 
presents this argument for appeal requesting that this court either overturn his 
conviction or remand the charges for a new trial on the merits of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 3, 2006, appellant, Joe David Bosquez arrived in the parking 
lot of the Video & Sound of Roosevelt, Utah. Transcript, pg. 150, lines 15-23. 
2. Mr. Bosquez was a resident of Cedar City, Utah, but was working in the 
Uintah Basin, near Roosevelt, Utah. Transcript, pg. 179, line 20; Transcript pg. 
180, lines 6-22. 
3. Mr. Bosquez was living in his car. Transcript pg. 182, line 12. 
4. Mr. Bosquez received a ride from a coworker to the video store to rent a 
video for his birthday. Transcript, pg. 181, line 19 - pg 182, line 2. 
5. After arriving at the store, the coworker driving the car left. Transcript pg. 
182, lines 5-12. 
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6. After the coworker left, Mr. Bosquez went to the nearby Maverick, used the 
facilities and went to his car to sleep. Transcript pg. 182, line 22 - pg. 183, line 7. 
7. After sleeping for a couple of hours, the defendant was awoken by an 
officer. Transcript pg. 183, lines 8-10; pg. 151, line 21 to pg. 152, line 15. 
8. The car was not on when the officer arrived and the officer did not check to 
see if the car hood was warm or not. Transcript pg. 173, lines 10-12. 
9. Everyone agrees that Mr. Bosquez was intoxicated on the night he was 
arrested. His blood alcohol level at the time of arrest was 0.269. Transcript pg 
160, lines 6-12. 
10. The officer testified at trial that the store clerk reported to dispatch that a 
person had driven to the parking lot and then leaned over the steering wheel and 
was asleep. Pg. 150, lines 15-19. The officer did not interview anyone from the 
store. Pg. 167, lines 10-22. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance of counsel when failing to object 
to hearsay evidence which provided the only basis for the state's conclusion that 
the appellant drove the vehicle? 
2. Did the appellant have physical control of the vehicle when he was intoxicated 
and sleeping in a vehicle, in which he lived, whether the keys were in the ignition 
or not? 
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I. TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHEN FAILING TO OBJECT TO INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE THAT WAS OVERLY PREJUDICIAL. 
An attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel when (1) trial 
counsel's performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (2) trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced [the 
defendant by depriving him of a fair trial." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ^ 
17, 153 P.3d 804 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The right to effective counsel is a 
guarantee provided in both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 12 and U.S. Constitution 4th Amendment. The right to counsel 
implies that the counsel will not only be licensed, but that they will be competent 
and diligent in working to assist their client through the often precarious legal 
world. When an attorney fails to meet the standard at which they should perform, 
they fail their client and the client should not be blamed for their fault. 
In this case, the failing of the attorney was a failure to protect the client from 
highly damaging inadmissible testimony. The only testimony in this case that the 
state was able to produce that the defendant drove the vehicle came from hearsay 
testimony repeated by the officer that indicated that a store clerk watched a person 
drive into the parking lot and then lean over and fall asleep on the wheel. 
Transcript of Jury Trial pg. 150, lines 15-19. There is no indication that the 
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witness was able to positively confirm that the person sleeping in the car was the 
person driving the vehicle. There is no indication how well the clerk could see the 
car, nor if they saw any passengers, or other indication that someone other than the 
defendant was in the vehicle. There is no indication that the officer ever 
questioned the clerk who made the statement, creating even more doubt in the 
translation given by the officer in his testimony on the stand. The only statement 
was ambiguous as to the identity of the driver. 
This testimony was unreliable at best, and was extremely prejudicial as it 
placed seeds in the jury's mind that would have formed an impression that the 
appellant had actually been driving the vehicle, in spite of an overwhelming lack of 
evidence to support that claim. Further this evidence could have been excluded 
under Utah Rules of Evidence 801, because it is hearsay not covered by any of the 
hearsay exceptions. 
Compounding this error is the fact that Trial Counsel failed to object to the 
instruction stating that the defendant could be found guilty if it was found that they 
had driven the vehicle. The state failed to produce any legitimate evidence that the 
defendant had driven the vehicle. It is clear that with this instruction the jury was 
allowed to consider this possibility in their deliberation and could have relied on 
the hearsay statement provided by the officer that the Defendant had been seen 
driving the vehicle. 
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Failure to object to the introduction of this evidence, and allowing an 
instruction that a defendant would be found guilty if it was determined that he had 
driven the car prejudiced the defendant, allowing the jury to convict on actual 
driving and not merely being in actual physical control, thus calling into question 
the validity of the jury's decision in this case. 
Because trial counsel failed to object to the damning hearsay, we cannot 
conclude that the jury actually convicted on reasonable and reliable evidence and 
the case should be remanded for a new trial so that an impartial jury can rehear the 
case without the unfounded prejudicial hearsay testimony. 
II. A PERSON IS NOT IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTOL OF A 
VEHICLE FOR PURPOSES OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
WHEN THAT PERSON LIVES IN THEIR VEHICLE AND IS SLEEPING 
IN THAT VEHICLE, 
As a matter of policy, when a person is drunk at night, the best place for 
them to be is in a place where they are not likely to hurt others or themselves. 
When a person who is drunk returns home to sleep and rest, they are going to a 
place of seclusion and rest. It is important to note that the officer needed to spend 
a significant effort to wake the appellant up. He had gone into the car to sleep, just 
as someone with a non-portable dwelling would go to their bed. 
The defendant went to the best place possible to seclude himself until he 
could sleep off his impairment. The fact that he slept in his car establishes a basis 
that his car, at the time it was set to the side of the road, was no longer acting as a 
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vehicle for the purposes of the law, but was rather acting as a dwelling. 
There are interesting cases on this issue, namely State v. Bamhart and 
Richfield city v. Walker, where the court determined that a person sleeping in the 
driving seat of a vehicle was in actual physical control of the vehicle, when the 
keys were in the ignition, because the person could wake up and decide to move 
the vehicle at any time. 
The position officers found Mr. Bosquez in is distinguished from those cases 
because in both of those cases, the defendants had attempted or intended to go 
somewhere else. In Barnhart, the defendant indicated that he was planning on 
having his girlfriend take him home. His final destination was not the store, 
staying at the store appeared to be just a temporary stop. In Walker, the defendant 
had attempted to secure lodging at a hotel, which was full, and could well have 
hunted for a new hotel. 
In the present case, Mr. Bosquez's residence during the week was his car. 
He testified that he would sleep in his car, in different spots at night. His final 
destination that night was his car; he was not a big risk of wanting to go 
somewhere else. The normal idea is that a person who is drunk should not be in 
physical control of a vehicle, but not that a person who is legally intoxicated 
should not sleep in their residence, even if that residence is a vehicle. Surely the 
legislature could not have intended to make homeless a person who lives in their 
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car simply because they are intoxicated. In fact, the case law reads: 
"[W]e look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
defendant was in actual physical control of his vehicle. Relevant factors for 
making this determination include, but are not limited to the following: (1) 
whether defendant was asleep or awake when discovered; (2) the position of 
the automobile; (3) whether the automobile's motor was running; (4) 
whether defendant was positioned in the driver's seat of the vehicle; (5) 
whether defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; (6) whether defendant 
had possession of the ignition key; (7) defendant's apparent ability to start 
and move the vehicle; (8) how the car got to where it was found; and (9) 
whether defendant drove it there." Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, at 
93 (Ut. App. 1990). 
The law is supposed to consider the whole picture and not just the handful of 
evidence, which allows this court to take into consideration the special 
circumstances of this case and find that for the purposes of Utah Code Annotated 
41-61-502, Mr. Bosquez was not in actual physical control of the vehicle. 
When considering the factors set forth in Richfield, we apply the factors to 
this case, the officer approaching Mr. Bosquez indicated that it took him some time 
to wake up Mr. Bosquez, who had clearly settled in for the night. The car was 
found parked in a parking spot at a local movie rental store. The motor was off. 
The defendant was sitting in the driver's seat, the defendant was then the sole 
occupant of the vehicle, the defendant had possession of the ignition key, and had 
the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle. 
Factors 8 and 9 appear to have conflicting evidence, but there was no 
evidence presented that should have been admitted, that would indicate that Mr. 
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Bosquez drove the vehicle to that spot. In fact the only admissible testimony as to 
how the vehicle arrived at that spot was from Mr. Bosquez himself, who indicated 
that a coworker had driven him to that spot and then left him in the parking lot. 
The prosecution only challenged this determination, but presented no legitimate 
evidence that Mr. Bosquez had driven. 
Now that we see the clear breakdown of the elements, we consider their 
importance. The only circumstances that fall against the defendant are the factors 
that indicated that he was alone in the vehicle, with possession of the keys, and that 
he could have started the car when he awoke. Given only these factors, it seems 
that the appellant could have had actual physical control of the vehicle, but that 
would ignore an important element of this case, that the appellant was living in his 
car at the time he was sleeping in his vehicle. With this factor, the location of the 
keys is less important in this circumstance than what Mr. Bosquez's behavior was. 
Mr. Bosquez was asleep, to such a degree that the officer had to knock on the door 
1 9 
"several times" and tap him on the leg before Mr. Bosquez could be awakened. 
The car was parked late at night in the parking lot of a store, in a position where 
the driver is likely to have gotten a quiet night's sleep. 
CONCLUSION 
The case should be dismissed, because no evidence that should have been 
1
 Trial Transcript pg. 152, line 6. 
Trial Transcript pg. 152, lines 7-9. 
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admissible provided any proof that the appellant drove the vehicle. Additionally, 
given the totality of the circumstances, it is evident that the defendant was going to 
sleep for the night at the parking lot of the Video & Sound, video rental store, 
making it such that it would be inappropriate for the court to determine that the 
defendant had actual physical control of the vehicle. 
In the alternative, because trial counsel was ineffective in preventing 
prejudicial evidence from being introduced to the jury, they prevented the jury 
from making a fair decision and a new trial should be ordered. 
Dated this 15th day of December, 2010. 
BRETT M. KRAUS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Corrected Opening 
Brief was mailed to the following this^S day of December, 2010: 
-rv 
Ryan Tenney 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
&y t 
Brett M. Kraus 
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BRETT KRAUS, #12357 
1745 North 400 West #101 
Logan, Utah 84341 
(435)752-1369 
bkrauslaw @ gmail.com 
Attorney for the Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOE DAVID BOSQUEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ADDENDUM 
Case No.: 20080158-CA 
Appellant, Joe David Bosquez, by and through his attorney, hereby submits the 
addendum containing an unsigned copy of the final order and judgment in this case for 
the following reasons: 
1. Appellant does not have an original copy of the order, but is attempting to 
secure an original copy. 
2. Counsel believes that the unsigned edition is identical to the signed copy. 
3. Therefore, Appellant requests that this court accept the unsigned order as 
the addendum until Appellant is capable of obtaining a signed copy. 
Dated this 27th day of December, 2010. 
State of Utah v. Bosquez 
Addendum 
Civil No. 20080158-CA 
Page 1 of 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BRETT M.KRAUS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Addendum was mailed to the 
following this 28th day of December, 2010: 
Ryan Tenney 
Assistant Attorney General 
Slate of Utah v. Bosquez 
Addendum 
Civil No. 20080158 - CA 
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STEPHEN D. FOOTE #8945 
DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
GRANT H. CHARLES #10865 
DEPUTY DUCHESNE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
(435)738-0184 
(435) 738-0186 (fax) 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OE THE STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, : JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
Criminal No. 061000417 
vs. : 
JOE DAVID BOSQUEZ, 
Judge John R. Anderson 
Defendant. 
—oooOooo— 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS - A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY 
ALCOHOL RESTRICTED DRIVER - A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
The above-entitled case came before the Court for Sentencing on Thursday, January 31, 
2008, the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson presiding. The defendant was present with his 
attorney, Stephanie Miya. The State of Utah was represented by Grant H. Charles, Deputy 
Duchesne County Attorney. The Court and the parties had received and reviewed the Pre-
sentence Investigation Report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. Statements were made 
by counsel for the parties and the defendant. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the file and record herein, it is hereby ORDERED, 
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ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
That the defendant has been convicted by a Jury of the offense of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 41-6a-502 
UCA (1953) as amended. That the defendant has been convicted by his own plea of guilty of the 
offense of Alcohol Restricted Driver, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6a-
530 UCA (1953) as amended. 
That for the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Third 
Degree Felony, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State Prison. That for the offense of Alcohol 
Restricted Driver, a Class B Misdemeanor, it is hereby ordered that the defendant is sentenced 
to serve a term of six (6) months in the Duchesne County Jail. Said prison and jail sentences 
shall run concurrently with each other. 
The foregoing prison and jail sentences are suspended and the defendant is placed on 
supervised probation with Adult Probation and Parole for a period of three (3) years upon the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. The defendant shall serve 365 days in the Duchesne County Jail. The defendant shall 
report to the jail no later than 12:00 noon, Friday, February 8, 2008. The jail sentence shall be 
reviewed on May 8, 2008. 
2. The defendant shall pay fines in the sum of $2,000 on terms set forth by Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
3. The defendant shall enter into and successfully complete substance abuse treatment 
and any aftercare recommended by the treatment facility. At the jail review on May 8, 2008, the 
Court will decide if the treatment shall be in-patient or out-patient. 
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4. The defendant shall install an ignition interlock device on any vehicle registered to 
him, and he shall not drive any vehicle without a ignition interlock device installed. 
5. The defendant shall not possess or consume alcohol or illegal controlled substances or 
be where alcohol or illegal controlled substances are being possessed or consumed. 
6. The defendant shall abide by any curfew imposed by Adult Probation and Parole. 
7. The defendant shall sign a consent to release form to allow Adult Probation and Parole 
or the Court to monitor his treatment. 
8. The defendant shall reimburse Duchesne County for his indigent counsel expenses in 
the sum of $500. 
DATED this day of February, 2008. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
JOHN R. ANDERSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
Stephanie Miya 
Attorney for Defendant 
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State of Utah vs. Joe David Bosquez 
Criminal No. 061000417 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the /<vf day of February, 2008,1 delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order to: 
Stephanie Miya 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 711819 
Salt Lake City UT 84171 
by depositing in her box at the Duchesne County Justice Center, Duchesne, Utah. 
OtMJlitrt. 
Legal Assistant 
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